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Rival firms often cooperate horizontally in order to share risks and achieve scale advantages in
production or in their research and development projects. The output of these strategic alliances is
usually sold by the individual ally company under its own brand and using its own marketing mix
strategies. Marketing strategies create a cumulative effect that is reflected in brand value. Although
horizontal alliances often have a significant overall impact on firm profitability, undesired brand value
dilution is a worrisome possibility for the partners and therefore a relevant subject of study. In this
paper, we consider brand value to be the economic added value of a brand, and propose two market-
based measures of brand value: (1) price premia (which are relevant for a unit sale) and (2) revenue
premia (which also account for the premia in sales volume). We apply this analysis to the Spanish market
for new automobiles, in which successful and long-lasting horizontal alliances have formed. Our findings
suggest that, during the introduction stage of the product life cycle, horizontal allies did not charge
different price premia, but that horizontal allies profit from differences in brand reputation obtained
from demand side effects such as revenue premia (specifically, the impact on sales volume).
Consequently, horizontal cooperation among brands does not dilute their value at the introduction
stage. Furthermore, our results suggest that horizontal allies do charge different price premia during the
growth stage of the product life cycle. Consequently, horizontal allies have recognized strategies that do
not dilute brand value in intense competition mitigating the brand value diluting risk.
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1. Introduction
Markets have been traditionally considered as competitive
arenas for companies selling substitutive products. But
competitors can simultaneously cooperate with each other
in developing horizontal alliances in which the allied firms
contribute similar resources in production processes or
research and development (R&D) to share risks or to enjoy
economies of scale: better access to raw materials, lower
risks in R&D projects and general gains in productivity,
for example. Horizontal alliances can be found in
industries ranging from consumer goods and pharmaceu-
ticals to automobiles and air travel (Bengtsson and Kock,
2000; Luo et al, 2007; Walley, 2007). These alliances can be
used to reduce transaction costs, gain access to new
technologies or resources, gain access to new geographic
and product markets, achieve economies of scale and
scope, reduce financial risks, integrate markets and
technologies, increase the rate of new product or process
development, and reduce the cost or risk of R&D
(Harbison and Perkar, 1995; Freidheim 1999; Luo et al,
2007). Horizontal alliances where partners all cooperate in
production or/and development but independently market
their products are common in numerous industries.
K A case in point is Ford, SEAT and Volkswagen
collaborating to produce a multi-purpose automobile,
and Ford selling it under the brand name Ford Galaxy,
SEAT selling it under the brand name SEAT Alhambra
and Volkswagen under the brand name Volkswagen
Sharan. Often, these products are identical (twin)
products sold with minor differences to develop brand
and product differentiation marketing strategies among
the different manufacturers. Such cooperative alliances
with competitors do not imply anticompetitive price
collusion; each manufacturer can charge a price
consistent with its market positioning, thereby obtaining
a different market share. These alliances are widespread
throughout the automobile industry and in numerous
other industries, including chemicals, plastics, steel,
electronics, computer peripherals and airlines services
(where partners cooperate in providing ground services
along with ticketing and reservations).
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K Another case of horizontal strategy is white labelling, in
which a manufacturer produces a product or service
that other companies (the marketers) rebrand to make
it appear as if they made it (Go´mez Arias and
Bello-Acebro´n, 2008). Quality equivalent white labels
offer equivalent tangible search and experience attri-
butes to national brands, and are indistinguishable
from national brands in blind (non-branded) product
test (Parker and Kim, 1997). White label strategies are
extended to a broad range of product categories such
as electronics, home appliances, plastics and even
computers. The main example is food retailing, in which
large retailers often buy products in bulk from
manufacturers and put their own brand name on them,
while manufacturer brand equivalents can be sold in the
same sales point.
The horizontal alliance seems to be an appropriate strategy
for mitigating the risk for the incumbents in a market
segment or product category. The flexibility intrinsic in
horizontal alliances facilitates the testing with new techno-
logies and markets. In the car industry case, both demand
uncertainty and competitive uncertainty are the catalysts
that impel competitors into horizontal alliances with each
other (Burgers et al, 1993). Demand uncertainty that arises
from unpredictable purchasing patterns and competitive
uncertainty that arises from competitive interdependence
are high in the initial face of the product cycle, as in the
case of a new car segment.
Horizontal alliances, however, are not without critics
from the marketing perspective. Associating one brand
with another involves a risk that should be addressed.
The risk arises not only from possible alliance failure;
some authors have suggested that brand alliances should
be approached strategically for fear of confounding
clients and diluting brand equity (Simonin and Ruth,
1998). If the consumer evaluation of the alliance outputs is
not favourable, it may result in a failed offering but also
original brand associations may suffer. Typical product
reviews in the automotive press are of the type: ‘It
(the SEAT Alhambra) is, in all but name and standard
equipment (you get more from SEAT) a Volkswagen
Sharan. Unless you attach some mythical value to the
VW brand you would be ga-ga to pay more for less’
(Wells, 2001). The damage of blurring could exist when
the consequence of the brand association with the ally
brand is a gradual whittling way of the identity of the
brand in the consumer minds and/or the attenuation
of the uniqueness of the brand in the public mind. More
research is needed to explore the brand diluting risk in
this context.
From the economics of information perspective, a brand
helps consumers to improve the perceived quality of a
product by reducing risk and the cost of search for
information. However, consumers face small informational
problems when comparing different brands of the same
(identical) product. The products of different horizontal
allies often share common unobserved attributes since they
have an almost identical design and they are produced
using the same inputs, with the same workers and the
same equipment in the same plant. In consequence, the
outputs of such kinds of horizontal alliances can be seen
as a natural experiment to examine whether brand premia
may be different for brands producing almost identical
products. In such cases, there are no objective reasons to
believe that the unobservable quality (the brand) is
different, with the considerable risk of brand value
dilution. Moreover, when the horizontal alliance has been
implemented as a strategy to enter a new product-market
segment, it offers an interesting live experiment about
brand premium evolution over the different phases of the
product life cycle. The methodology proposed here can
help to answer such questions.
1.1. Measuring the brand value impact of horizontal
alliances
The concept of brand value has long been an issue in
marketing theory; yet there is still no consensus about the
underlying elements for its measurement. Many researchers
have considered brand value from a psychological
perspective on the assumption that customer mindset
constructs are precursors of observable market behaviour
(see, eg, Keller, 1993; Aaker, 1996; Agarwal and Rao,
1996; Feldwick, 1996; Ambler and Barwise, 1998; Ailawadi
et al, 2003; Keller, 2003; Keller and Lehmann, 2003).
Given the pressure on marketing managers to justify their
spending, the financial measurement of brand value has
become a critical issue (Rust et al, 2004). In this paper,
therefore, we consider brand value in terms of economic
premium in the marketplace.
Price premium has been used as an outcome measure
of brand value. Baltas and Saridakis (2009, 2010) imple-
ment a hedonic model to study price premia as indicators
of brand equity in the car market. But price premium
alone cannot explain all the trade-offs between brand
value determinants, because price can reflect the pro-
duct’s strategic positioning in the market, rather than the
cumulative success of previous marketing strategies. For
this reason, this paper extends those works—proposing
both price and revenue premium measures to study the
effects of strategic alliances on brand values. We propose
the use of revenue premia, measured as the brand dummy
coefficients from a regression of log revenues (log of sales
multiplied by prices) on product attributes, brands and
seasonal time dummies. Then we obtain a revenue premia
measure that subtracts the influence of product differ-
entiation (ie, the differential effect of physical attributes
on revenues).
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1.2. The twin-car industry case
We apply the insights of this brand value analysis to the
multi purpose vehicle (MPV) market in Spain. As
mentioned before, over the past two decades, independent
carmakers have collaborated by forming long-lasting
strategic horizontal alliances to develop and produce
common vehicles, while taking advantage of economies
of scale. These vehicles, called twin cars, are sold as
separate models of different brands. In Europe, the
production of twin cars was first developed during
the 1990s as a strategy for many car producers to enter
the MPV segment. Twin cars share common observed
(search) and unobserved (experience and credence) attri-
butes, as they are produced jointly in the same plant, using
the same inputs, with the same workers and the same
equipment. Twin cars are designed almost identically,
but different versions of different brands of the same twin
car may have distinctive observed attributes, which can be
used to differentiate the products produced by different
carmakers. The automobile sector adopts a hierarchical
brand architecture that consists of a shared parent brand
name, a shared model name and a unique version
component. In the case of twin cars, we found that
different parent brands participate in a horizontal alliance.
The result of this alliance is a new model of car with
an identical design. As mentioned, Ford, SEAT and
Volkswagen, for example, have engaged in an alliance for
the development of the MPV car since 1995. This new car
is sold by each parent brand under different model brands:
Galaxy, Alhambra and Sharan. These three automobile
manufacturers have identical base production costs, as
their vehicles are produced in the same factory; their
revenue premia, therefore, is a good proxy of returns
premia. More recently, Ford and Fiat, on the one side,
and Nissan and Suzuki, on the other, signed agreements
to co-operate on the joint development and production
of twin cars models Ka, 500, Pixo and Alto for the
introduction into the very small car segment. Similar
examples can be found in the compact crossover segment,
with Mitsubishi Outlander, Citroe¨n C-Crosser and
Peugeot 4007.
Furthermore, when computing revenue premium, only
transaction prices will reflect consumers’ valuation of the
brand names. As in many cases panel data contain only
information regarding list prices, we present a modified
stochastic frontier approach to control for the brand value
of uncontrolled discounts. This is the case of the MPV
market at hand particularly in which there are dealers’
discounts (but there were no manufacturers’ discounts
during the period we studied). We estimate average
discounts for each version of each car model using a
stochastic frontier model. This model is a regression model
of log revenues (log of sales multiplied by prices) on
product attributes, brands and seasonal time dummies, in
which an additional non-negative random shock is added
to incorporate dealers’ discount effects. Therefore, this type
of models has two sources of ‘noise’ or error terms: one
that is two-side normally distributed and another one that
is one-side non-negative normally distributed. The first one
is not directly attributable to revenues, accounting for
uncertainty in the frontier model; but the second error part
is assumed to be non-negative, representing a measure of
deviation from the ordinary regression model.
Our results suggest that in the introduction stage of the
product life cycle of MPV market, the price premia for all
the brands allied do not differ significantly, even though
their price premia differ in other market segments. In
particular, we test if there are, in general, differences in
price premia for different carmakers in other segments,
such as the utilitarian and compact segments of the
Spanish automobile market. Our findings suggest that, in
general, price premia differ across carmakers. Although
allied companies do not charge a price premium for twin
cars during the introduction stage of their product life
cycle (which could be a positioning strategy for the MPV
segment or could be caused by myopic managerial
expectations about customers’ brand mindset), they still
benefit from the revenue premium. In the MPV market,
we find that revenue premia are significantly different for
brands of twin cars—even for those brands of twin cars
with a similar range of price premium, implying that
horizontal alliances do not dilute brand value.
However, our results suggest that horizontal allies do
charge different price premia during the growth stage
of the product life cycle. Furthermore, during this
stage, allied manufacturers have increased twin-product
differentiation (eg, the differences in the second gene-
ration of twin cars Citroe¨n–Fiat–Lancia–Peugeot are more
pronounced; and the second generation of twin cars
Ford–Volkswagen–SEAT shares only 80% of the attri-
butes, keeping the remaining 20% of the characteristics
brand specific), searching for reasons to differentiate
prices (at least other reasons beyond perceived brand
value). Horizontal allies have recognized strategies that
do not dilute brand value in intense competition mitigating
the brand value diluting risk.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In
Section 2, we present the empirical model and the
estimation methodology. Section 3 describes the data
and Section 4 presents the results. In Section 5, we
formulate conclusions and discuss their marketing strategic
implications.
2. Model, estimation and testing
Hedonic regressions have become common practice for
the estimation of product quality bias in price indexes, after
the contribution work of Court (1939) (see also Griliches,
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1971; Gordon, 1990), and the analysis of price premium in
brand value (Lado et al, 2004; Baltas and Saridakis 2009,
2010). In contrast, this paper looks at hedonic revenue
premium as a measure of brand value.
Assuming that some of the attributes are observable and
others not, the revenue value can be broken down into two
components and we get that log{pjqj}¼
P
iAIaixijþbbj,
where pj is the observed price of product j; qj is the quantity
consumed of product j, I is the set of observable attributes
and bj is the brand value (measuring the value of
unobservable attributes). In other words, hedonic revenue
premium is a regression equation of the observable
attributes of a product and its brand value. In this paper,
we test if the coefficients of brand dummies associated
with the same twin car are statistically identical; that is,
whether revenue premia are similar for the companies
involved in the horizontal alliance. In particular, we
examine revenue premia in the MPV Spanish automobile
market. A carmaker brand sells a variety of versions of a
single model. Our basic units of observations are car
versions. Version i (i¼ 1, . . . , I ) in period t (t¼ 1, . . . ,T )
is defined by a set of observable characteristics, described
by a vector of attributes Xit. We study differences in
revenue premia defined as differences in revenue because
of the brand. We model the revenue premium by a linear
regression with panel data,
logRit ¼ aþ g0Xit þ d0dt þ b0bi þ eit; ð1Þ
where logRit is the logarithmic transformation of revenue
(the transaction price times the quantity sold); dt is a
monthly dummy controlling for changes in nominal prices;
bi is a brand dummy capturing the brand value, and eit are
independent random shocks normally distributed N(0,se
2)
and independent from the regressors. To avoid multi-
collinearity, we omit one brand category (the benchmark)
for each dummy set. The estimates of parameters
associated with the brand dummies b describe the relation-
ship between revenue premium and brand value in
differences with respect to the omitted brand. We study
the existence of differences in revenue premia for those
brands producing the same twin car by testing the identity
of coefficients associated with their associated brand
dummies using a likelihood ratio (LR) test. The LR test
is a statistical test that compares the log likelihood of
model (2) and a simpler nested model in which the
coefficients associated with their respective brand dummies
are equal; that is LR¼ 2 (lnL1lnL2), where lnL1 is
the maximum value of the likelihood of the data without
the additional assumption and lnL2 is the maximum value
of the likelihood when the parameters are constrained.
Under the null hypothesis, the LR statistic asymptotically
follows a wk
2 distribution, where k is equal to the number
of constraints.
There is a major issue related to hedonic revenue
analysis: often there are no systematic and complete
records on dealer discounts or on transaction prices.
Instead, in many cases panel data contain only information
regarding list prices. To overcome this problem, we
estimate average discounts using a stochastic frontier
model. The stochastic frontier production function was
independently proposed by Aigner et al (1977), Meeusen
and van den Broeck (1977) and Battese and Corra (1977).
Battese and Coelli (1995) proposed a stochastic frontier
production frontier for panel data. Frontier regression
models seek to explain frontier behaviour rather than
average behaviour as in ordinary regression models. Such
a model may also be called a ceiling model as it lies above
all the observations. Here we use a stochastic frontier
model of the logarithmic transformation of listed prices pij,
the dependence variable, modelled as a lineal relationship
of the multiple independent variables (Xit, dt, bi for each
version i¼ 1, . . . , I and each period t¼ 1, . . . ,T) plus an
error term composed of two parts: the first error part is
normally distributed with mean zero, accounting for
uncertainty in the frontier model; and the second error
part is non-negative, representing a measure of deviation
from the ordinary regression model and therefore the
discounts from the listed prices. In other words,
log pit ¼ aþ g0Xit þ d0dt þ b0bi þ eit þ ui; ð2Þ
where eit are independent random shocks normally
distributed N(0,se
2) and independent from the regressors,
and ui are non-negative shocks so that E[ui]>0. This
modelling separates the impact of factors that cannot be
controlled (eit exogenous shocks) and a one-sided non-
negative error term ui representing a function of the
stochastic discounts of car dealers. We consider that ui is
time-invariant for all period t, since auto industry experts
at the Instituto de Estudios de Automocio´n (IEA) and the
Autopista Magazine confirm that discount percentages
applied to listed prices are always positive and relatively
stable over the sample period for each car version. This
model cannot be consistently estimated by standard panel
data methods. However, assuming ui is a truncated
normally distributed variable (ie, ui¼ |Ui| and Ui are
assumed to be independently distributed normal N(m,su
2)),
the maximum likelihood estimators for the model (2) can
be computed by standard numerical methods (see, eg,
Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).
Equation (2) shows the relationship between observed
listed prices pij and actual transaction prices Pit. The log
of the transaction prices Pit is given by the difference
between the log of the listed prices pij and an error ui; that
is, log Pit¼ log pitui; then,
log
pit
Pit
¼ ui: ð3Þ
Using the estimates of ui, we can compute the discount
percentage applied to listed prices for each car version i.
Let xi be the per cent discount on listed prices pit; that is,
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Pit¼ (1xi)pit. Then, Pit/pit¼ (1xi), and using (3),
(1xi)¼ 1/exp(ui). As a consequence, the percentage of
discount xi is defined as
xi ¼ 1 1
exp ui
 
: ð4Þ
3. Data
The original database was provided by the Spanish IEA.
The IEA collects data for 48 parent brands, 300 model
brands and more than 5000 versions, representing most of
the entire population of automobiles sold in the Spanish
market. In this study, we used monthly data from July
1997 to May 2000, the introduction stage of the MPV life
cycle, and January 2005 to December 2007, the growth
stage of the MPV life cycle.
The data set from July 1997 to May 2000 includes listed
prices, sales and 17 relevant characteristics for brand
models at the version level (variants of the original) in the
MPV, utilitarian and compact categories. The MPV
category comprises 155 versions of 13 brand models (and
13 parent brands, one for each model). The number of
observations of this panel data is 2677. Among these 13
brand models are two sets of twin cars. The first twin set
includes Citroen Evasion, Fiat Ulysses, Lancia Zeta and
Peugeot 806; and the second includes Ford Galaxy,
SEAT Alhambra and Volkswagen Sharan. Other models
(non-twin models) included in the database are Mazda
MPV, Mitsubishi Space-wagon, Nissan Serena, Opel
Sintra and Renault Espace. On average, an MPV car in
our sample costs approximately about $42 819 and the
average sales growth rate is 0.7% per year. The panel data
of the utilitarian category contain 5545 observations and
information on 460 versions of 10 brand models (and 10
parent brands). On average, a utilitarian car in our sample
costs approximately $18 669 and the monthly sales are
about 1975 car units. The panel data of the compact
category include 642 versions of 12 brand models (11
parent brands and 6402 observations). On average, a
compact car in our sample costs approximately $25 791
and the monthly sales are about 1629 car units. Given the
fact that in the three car categories, all the parent brands,
with the exception of the one in the compact category, have
a unique brand model, it is impossible to separate the value
of the parent brand from the model brand value. For this
reason, we continue our analysis on brand cars in general.
The matrix Xit is defined by 17 observable characteristics
for each car version i and each period t, which can be
categorized into two different types: the continuous
variables of engine power (h.p.), top speed (km/h),
acceleration (sec. in 0–100km/h), volume (m3), fuel
consumption (liters/100km), cylinder capacity (c.c.);
and the discrete dummy variables of air-conditioning,
automatic climate, front power windows, rear power
windows, driver airbag, passenger airbag, ABS brakes,
remote lock, on-board computer, alloy wheels and turbo—
taking values of 1 if this attribute is included in the
standard equipment, and 0 otherwise. As the descriptive
statistics for the diesel and gasoline automobiles
are relatively different, we include a dummy for diesel
engines that aims to capture the difference. Furthermore,
given that our sample period coincides with the diffusion
of the direct injection technology—the so-called TDIs—
among the turbo-diesel models, we also introduce a
dummy that accounts for this fact.
The data set from January 2005 to December 2007
includes listed prices, sales and 17 characteristics for brand
models at the version level (variants of the original) in the
MPV market of automobiles sold in the Spanish market
from January 2005 to December 2007. Six of these
characteristics were present in all the versions in this
period, resulting not relevant for the analysis. The MPV
category comprises 166 versions of 12 brand models (and
12 parent brands). The number of observations of this
panel data is 5868. Among these 12 brand models are two
sets of twin cars. The first twin set includes Citroen C8,
Fiat Ulysses, Lancia Phedra and Peugeot 807; and the
second includes Ford Galaxy, SEAT Alhambra and
Volkswagen Sharan. Other models (non-twin models)
included in the database are Chrysler Voyager, Chrysler
Grand Voyager, Hyundai H-1, Kia Carnival, Renault
Espace, Renault Gran Espace and Ssangyong Rodius.
On average, an MPV car in our sample costs approxi-
mately $45 610 and the average sales growth rate is 6.7%
per year. We do not consider other categories for this
period of time, because we observe a different price
premium for each parent brand, and therefore, we can
conclude that there is a differentiation strategy among
manufactures as in other categories in which there are not
horizontal alliances.
The matrix Xit is defined by 17 observable characteristics
for each car version i and each period t, which can be
categorized into two different types: the continuous
variables of engine power (h.p.), top speed (km/h), volume
(m3), cylinder capacity (c.c.); and the discrete dummy
variables of type of compressor, alloy wheels, ABS brakes,
stability control system, information technology system,
passenger airbag, remote lock—taking values of 1 if this
attribute is included in the standard equipment, and 0
otherwise. Note that in this case, there are more redundant
or insignificant attributes than before because of the
technological advances of the industry.
Note that this is a rich database, particularly suitable
for studying the interrelationships between product differ-
entiation and horizontal alliances. Sullivan (1998) consid-
ered twin cars in the US second-hand market, but from the
company’s strategic perspective, the new automobile
market offers the convenience of being able to study
horizontal alliances.
5
4. Results
Our first step is to calculate the average percentage
discount from the listed price. Then we estimate the
parameters of the stochastic frontier model (2). For data
corresponding to the first time period, Table 1 reports the
Wald test showing the global significance of the explana-
tory variables in model (2) and the goodness of fit of
model (2). Table 1 also reports the brand estimates of
model (2) as discussed in Section 2; in the first column, we
report the coefficient estimates associated with brand
dummies and the standard errors are reported in the
second column. The estimated constant conveys the price
premia of the reference brand, Renault (the benchmark
category because Renault is the brand leader in 1997).
All the coefficient estimates must be interpreted in terms
of percent change, as model (2) considers a logarithmic
transformation of price. The Wald test shows the global
significance of the explanatory variables in model (2) and
the goodness of fit of model (2). All brand dummies but
Opel are significantly different from zero, meaning that
brands have significantly different price premia to the
reference brand, Renault, the largest difference being
0.19 between Renault and Mitsubishi. As this estimate
is negative, we can conclude that the average price
premium of Mitsubishi is 19% lower than the average
price premium of Renault. We also find a significantly
large difference in the average price premia between
Renault and Mazda and Renault and Nissan: 0.16. For
these brands of twin cars, the differences in the average
price premia are significantly different from zero, but
smaller. All the signs of price premia estimates for Twin 1
(Citroen, Fiat, Peugeot and Lancia) are negative, with
the exception of Lancia. This finding implies that, in terms
of percentage change, the average price premia of Citroen,
Fiat and Peugeot are below the reference brand, Renault.
In contrast, the average price premium of Lancia is higher
than Renault’s. This is an indication that price premia
between brands of Twin 1 are significantly different.
Table 1 also reports the brand estimates and car
attributes estimates of model (2) as discussed in Section 2.
All the coefficient estimates must be interpreted in terms of
per cent change, as model (2) considers a logarithmic
transformation of price. The Wald test shows the global
significance of the explanatory variables in model (2) and
the goodness of fit of model (2). All car attributes estimates
are significantly different from zero, meaning that car
attributes have a significant effect on price premia, with the
performance-related attributes (engine power, speed and
cylinder capacity, turbo and turbo diesel) being those with
higher positive effect. The coefficient of volume is also
significantly high and positive, as expected in this type
of cars. Also, features related to comfort and luxury
(air-conditioning, automatic climate, front power windows,
rear power windows, alloy wheels) have significant positive
coefficients but not high ones. The coefficient of fuel
consumption has an unexpected significant positive effect
on price premia, but note that in this type of cars, engine
power is highly correlated to fuel consumption and
European MPVs are generally powered by large engines
with high fuel consumption.
Next, we formally test whether all the coefficients
associated to brand dummies are identical (ie, all brands
have the same price premia) using an LR test. The LR
statistics takes the value 96.19 and the null hypothesis
is rejected at a 95% significance level. Table 2 reports the
LR test for the null hypothesis of no differences in price
premia on carmakers producing the same twin. When
the null hypothesis is rejected, there is an indication that
price premia are not necessarily equal for the considered
Table 1 Parameter estimates for MPV segmentw (first period).
Dependent variable: Log(Price)
Variables Coefficient Standard error
Coefficients of brand dummies
Citroen 0.047** 0.011
Fiat 0.050** 0.0124
Lancia 0.079** 0.011
Peugeot 0.032** 0.011
Ford 0.042** 0.012
SEAT 0.030** 0.011
Volkswagen 0.049** 0.013
Mazda 0.16** 0.016
Mitsubishi 0.19** 0.020
Opel 0.015 0.018
Nissan 0.16** 0.027
Constant 10.03** 0.442
Coefficients of car characteristics
Engine power 0.141** 0.05
Speed 0.014** 0.06
Acceleration 0.007** 0.02
Volume 0.242** 0.03
Consumption 0.269** 0.07
Cylinder capacity 0.397** 0.07
Air conditioning 0.039** 0.00
Automatic climate 0.033** 0.00
Front power windows 0.022** 0.01
Rear power windows 0.007** 0.00
Driver airbag 0.015** 0.01
Passenger airbag 0.003** 0.00
ABS brakes 0.005** 0.00
Remote lock 0.002** 0.00
Information technology 0.010** 0.00
Alloy wheels 0.040** 0.00
Turbo 0.055** 0.01
Turbo diesel 0.185** 0.03
Petrol 0.030** 0.05
Wald test w71
2 9458.09
Prob 4w71
2 0.00
Log likelihood 6494.3
* and ** significant at 10% and 5% level, respectively.
wOnly brand dummies are shown.
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brands. We observe that the price premia of brands that do
not belong to a twin car (Mazda, Mitsubishi, Opel, Nissan)
are significantly different. Furthermore, the LR statistics
related to Twin 1 (Citroen, Fiat, Lancia, Peugeout)
indicates that the price premia of these brands are also
significantly different. A close analysis of these brands is
reported in Table 3. The differences on price premium of
Twin 1 are given by the pair Lancia and Fiat, while the
remaining brands have similar price premia (see Table 3).
The results suggest that allied firms producing the same
twin adopt identical price positioning (once attribute
variations are discounted), suggesting that they position
their product as identical in terms of economic value for
the customer. Clearly, if customers’ sales responses are not
identical for these twin cars this must be due to different
mind-set perceptions of the brand value that were
uncounted for by the producers.
It is also relevant to study whether or not companies
involved in the horizontal alliance were self-selected
because they already lack price-premium differences. One
possible explanation is that only firms with similar price
premium value involve themselves in horizontal alliances.
To test this hypothesis, we have estimated model (2) for
other car categories (such as utilitarian and compact cars)
in which there is no production of twin cars (maintaining
Renault as the omitted group). We found differences in
price premia in utilitarian and compact cars among
carmakers, even those that produce the same twin car in
the MPV category. Therefore, in general, the brands
involved in this type of alliances have price-premium
differences in other car categories in which there are no
production of twin cars.
Our next step was to consider Equation (4) to calculate
the average percentage discount from the listed price, and
we compute the sample mean of {xi}. Let xˆi be the estimate
of discounts applied to the listed prices of each car version
i. Table 4 shows the average discounts for each brand,
computed by averaging the estimates {xˆi} of the subsample
given by all versions i of each brand. We observe that
Renault dealers offer the largest average discount—
approximately 11%. We also observe differences in the
pattern of average discounts for Twin 1. Citroen offers
the second highest discount, at an average of 9%; Fiat and
Peugeot dealer discounts average 6% and 7%, respectively;
and Lancia, at an average of 3%, has the second lowest
discount. This is an indication that the discount policies for
retailers of the allied brands of Twin 1 are also significantly
different, and that listed prices cannot be used to estimate
brand value. The sample mean of the sequence {xˆi} is the
percentage of average discount for the MPV category, 0.10;
in other words, we estimate that consumers are able to
obtain discounts up to an average of 10%. According
to the opinion of industry experts, this valuation seems to
be reasonable. In the Spanish automobile market, dealers
are willing to bargain on their profit margin, which often
ranges from 15 to 25%, depending on the brand and type
of vehicle. For the period considered here, however,
discounts and promotions were lower in the MPV
category. Also MPVs can be considered a luxury product,
and therefore the target potential customer will be affluent
families whose decision making is less influenced by
discounts. Furthermore, manufacturers did not offer
rebates or any other types of promotional discounts during
this period.
We then focus on the revenue premium in the MPV
category. We consider an estimate of the revenue for each
car version i and each period t, Rit¼ (1xˆi)pitVit, where
{xˆi} is the estimate of discounts applied to the listed prices
Table 2 The average discounts for different brands in the
MPV category
Brand Average discount (%)
Citroen 9.5
Fiat 6.3
Lancia 3.7
Peugeot 7.9
Ford 5.1
SEAT 8.5
Volkswagen 4.9
Mazda 3.9
Mitsubishi 9.1
Opel 1.8
Nissan 5.0
Renault 11.7
Table 3 The LR test for the null hypothesis of no differences in
price premia
H0: gcitroen gfiat glancia gpeugeout (Twin 1)
w3
2 223.05
Prob4w3
2 0.000
H0: gford gseat gvolksw (Twin 2)
w2
2 2.65
Prob4w2
2 0.26
H0: gmazda gmitsubishi gopel gnissan (Non allied brands)
w3
2 67.74
Prob4w3
2 0.00
Table 4 The LR test for the null hypothesis of no differences in
price premia in Twin 1
H0: gfiat=glancia
w2
2 135.62
Prob4w2
2 0.00
H0:gcitroen=gpeugeout
w2
2 2.31
Prob4w2
2 0.12
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of each car version i, and Vit are the sales at time t. Least
squares estimation of model (1) will provide consistent
estimates of the coefficients associated with brand dum-
mies. The estimated constant represents the revenue premia
of the reference brand, Renault. All brand dummies but
Nissan are significant (see Table 3). Their significance in
the revenue response model (3) implies that there is
evidence of differences in revenue premia in the MPV
category. We also found that the LR statistics reject
equality of revenue premia of brands in both, Twin 1 and
Twin 2. Therefore, we found differences in revenue premia
among carmakers, even those that produce the same twin
car in the MPV category. As a consequence, this indicates
that brand value does have an impact on the firms’
revenues, even though, as a result of horizontal alliances,
carmakers do not charge price premia to their customers
(Table 5).
Next, Table 6 presents the estimated of model (2) for
data between 2005 and 2007. The Wald test shows the
global significance of the explanatory variables in model (2)
and the goodness of fit of model (2). All brand dummies
are significantly different from zero and negative, meaning
that brands have significantly different and lower price
premia than the reference brand, Renault. The largest
differences with the reference brand are between Renault
and Korean manufacturers (Ssanyong, Hyundai and Kia),
with the average price premium of Korean manufacturers
being between 25 and 36% lower than the average price
premium of Renault. We also find a significantly small
difference in the average price premia between Renault and
Ford: 0.023. We also observe that the difference in the
average price premia between Renault and those brands of
Twin 1 (Citroen, Fiat, Lancia, Peugeot) differ significantly
among them. More significantly, this is the case for Twin 2
(Ford, SEAT, Volkswagen). This is an indication that price
premia between brands of twin cars are significantly
different.
All car attributes estimates are significantly different
from zero, meaning that car attributes have significant
effect on price premia, with the performance-related
attributes (engine power, speed and cylinder capacity)
being those with higher positive effect. The coefficient of
volume is also significantly high and positive, as expected
in this type of cars.
Finally, we formally test whether all the coefficients
associated to brand dummies are identical (ie, all brands
have the same price premia) using an LR test. The null
hypothesis of no differences in price premia on carmakers
producing the same twin is rejected for Twin 1 (Citroen,
Fiat, Lancia, Peugeout) and Twin 2 (Ford, Seat, Volkswa-
gen). Also, we observe that the price premia of brands that
do not belong to a twin car are significantly different.
Therefore, allied partners of twin car have reconsidered the
Table 5 Estimated results for MPV segmentw. Dependent
variable: Log(Revenue)
Variables Coefficient Standard error
Citroen 0.73** 0.07
Fiat 1.58** 0.09
Lancia 2.63** 0.09
Peugeot 0.24** 0.07
Ford 0.94** 0.09
SEAT 0.61** 0.09
Volkswagen 1.25** 0.10
Mazda 3.52** 0.13
Mitsubishi 1.00** 0.13
Opel 1.43** 0.10
Nissan 0.099 0.13
Constant 2.39 4.70
F(71 2521) 137.98
Prob4F(71 2521) 0.00
R square 0.7953
* and ** significant at 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
wOnly brand dummies are shown.
Table 6 Parameter estimates for MPV segmentw (second
period). Dependent variable: Log(Price)
Variables Coefficient Standard error
Coefficients of brand dummies
Chrysler 0.077** 0.006
Citroen 0.087** 0.006
Fiat 0.072** 0.007
Ford 0.023** 0.005
Hyundai 0.275** 0.008
Kia 0.265** 0.006
Lancia 0.042** 0.005
Peugeot 0.089** 0.004
SEAT 0.169** 0.003
Ssanyong 0.361** 0.008
Volkswagen 0.066** 0.005
Constant 2.498** 0.450
Coefficients of car characteristics
Cylinder capacity 0.327** 0.009
Engine power 0.219** 0.012
Speed 0.104** 0.028
Volume 0.160** 0.018
Compressor 0.116** 0.003
Alloy wheels 0.075** 0.003
ABS brakes 0.075** 0.006
Stability Control 0.013** 0.004
Information tech. 0.075** 0.004
Passenger airbag 0.020** 0.003
Remote lock 0.041** 0.007
Wald test w22
2 35959.05
Prob4w22
2 0.00
Log likelihood 7529.5
* and ** significant at 10% and 5% level, respectively.
wOnly brand dummies are shown.
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marketing strategy of having identical price premia, and
now they are adopting different price positioning.
Furthermore, during the growth stage of the product life
cycle of MPVs, the discounts, as expected, in this category
were even lower than in the introductory phase in the
Spanish market because MPVs can be considered a luxury
product. At the stage of growth, the market shares of the
brands have achieved some stability. The discounts used
in the introductory phase to encourage the purchase and
develop the initial application are minimized. Moreover,
in this period, the entry of Korean cars with a low price
positioning neutralizes the countdown policy of the dealers
of other brands.
5. Conclusions
Brand value is a holistic concept synthesizing the effect of
competitive marketing strategies. It is commonly concep-
tualized as the added value with which a given brand
endows a product. We adopt the firm-centered conceptua-
lization of brand value as the residual value not explained
by objectives attributes.
Researchers studying horizontal alliances, in which a
partner is simultaneously a competitor, have argued that it
is the most beneficial relationship between competitors
(Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Walley, 2007). These strategies
implemented to mitigate the market risk of entering a new
product market could leverage other kinds of risks. The
high level of demand uncertainty and competitive un-
certainty present in the introduction in a new product-
market are the catalysts that drive competitors into
horizontal alliances with each other (Burgers et al, 1993).
As Luo et al (2007) have noted, excessive competition
introduces a new kind of risk that is the risk of
vulnerability. Moreover, brand alliances involved a mar-
keting risk; the risk of confounding clients and diluting
brand equity. It is our understanding that almost no study
has empirically investigated the brand diluting risk of
horizontal alliances. Our study focuses on the impact
of horizontal alliances strategies on brand value.
Our findings suggest that in the new automobile market
in Spain, horizontal alliances do not dilute brand value.
However, the mechanism through which the brands assert
their brand value differs along the stages of product life
cycle. In the early stage of the product life cycle, horizontal
strategic alliances dilute the price premia of brands, but we
found significant differences in brand revenue premia. The
brand consumer-centered mechanism, the response of
customer via volume, allows firms to see their brand value
reflected. We found that allied partners are reluctant to
adopt different price positioning, given that the twin
products are identical. In the mature phase, partners have
reconsidered this strategy and have increased the twin
product differentiation. The results suggest that, to some
extent, manufacturers have searched for reasons to
differentiate prices (at least other reasons beyond perceived
brand value). We observe that price premia differences
reflect the differences in the costumers’ willingness to pay
for the different allied brands.
In brief, analysis using hedonic regressions was per-
formed on data generated from two different time periods.
The first period relied on data from 1997 to 2000. In this
period twin cars alliance were used as a strategy to
introduce in a new market segment. The partners’ brands
do not differentiate the products (the car designs were
identical). We observe that in the initial phase of the
alliance agreement, brands avoid aggressive reactions
of the allies by alienating the price premium tactics. As
a result, and perhaps as a strategy for competitive risk
reduction, we detect that carmakers do not charge different
brand premium. This trend indicates that managers tend
to perceive price differentiation as a risky decision when
the products are closely designed. With the exception of
Lancia, they have been charging roughly the same price,
and allowing their customers’ mind-set brand value
differences to be the basis for sales differences, and
therefore for revenue premia. In addition, they used price
discount as a discrimination price strategy to stimulate
short-term demand reaction. The brand revenue is
significantly different, indicating that volume was the
factor that allows brand to benefit from the different
brand reputation.
The second period analysis, based on data generated
from 2005 to 2007, indicates a reversal and the price
premium of the twin cars brands are now significantly
different. The new flexible production systems allow the
carmakers to differentiate the car aspect and design. The
growth of the segment and the reduction of uncertainty
about competitive reactions relaxes the competitive
pressures and allows the brand to charge different price
premium. The discount tactics become less interesting.
From the methodological point of view, this research
makes a twofold contribution.
First, as the marketing literature postulates, there is a
gap between the perceived attributes of a product by the
buyers and the observed attributes by the manufacturers.
In addition, there is a gap between the attributes observed
by the manufacturers and measured by the researchers,
since some attributes could be omitted or neglected in a
research study. An attribute observed by the economic
agents, such as reputation or a new technologic advantage,
for example, that is common to all versions of a brand,
could not be measured by the researcher. In the estimation,
the value of this attribute is collected by the brand dummy
coefficient. What is less clear is whether this is part of the
brand premia or if it corresponds to the value of an omitted
(by the researcher) attribute. For this reason it is difficult to
compare the estimated coefficients of different brands.
However, cars belonging to the same twin share most
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of the omitted characteristics. Thus, differences in the
estimated coefficients of brand dummies may be inter-
preted as differences in brand premia.
Many other sectors can be considered. In particular, our
methodology is very useful to study the brand value of
a product marketed under different brands, or private
label brands, for instance.
Second, there is another major issue related to hedonic
revenue analysis: rarely are systematic and complete
records on transaction prices available. To surmount this
difficulty, we estimate average discounts using a stochastic
frontier model.
Future research could analyse the effect of competitor
alliance on the different brand levels, differentiating the
impact of the alliance on the value of the parent brand and
the value of the model brand. In the segment of the
automobiles that we have studied, each parent brand has
only one model brand. Consequently, we cannot differ-
entiate the impact on the parent brand from the impact on
the model brand name. In this paper, we focus on brand
value from the managerial point of view; another
potentially valuable and complementary future research
stream could be the study of the impact of horizontal
brand alliances on customer perceptions.
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